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1. Broad Structure of International Grain Markets 
In analysing the international grain market, and its relationship to food security issues 
in developing countries, it is important to be aware of some basic structural 
characteristics of the world grain market. International trade in grains forms a 
relatively low proportion of total world production, and may be divided roughly into 
wheat and coarse grains (comprising maize, barley, sorghum, oats and rye which are 
used primarily- though not exclusively- in animal feeds) 1 . Around 25% of wheat 
production and between 12% and 15% of coarse grains production is traded 
internationally. 
1.1 Grain Exports 
The international grain market is dominated by a relatively small number of exporting 
countries which supply a high proportion of the grain traded on the world market. 
There are also a number of relatively less important exporting countries which export 
on a periodic basis when their domestic harvest is good and exceeds domestic 
requirements. The main exporters are shown in table 1. 
Table 1: Major Grain Exporting Countries (OOOs tonnes) 
Source: World Grain Statistics 1994, International Wheat Council, London. 
1 Rice is excluded from this analysis due to the low proportion of production that is 
traded on world markets and its quite separate and specific market characteristics. 
Among what may be termed 'developing' countries there are a relatively small number 
of significant exporters, as follows. 
Argentina: major exporter of wheat (around 6 million tonnes) and coarse grains 
(around 5 to 6 million tonnes) 
South Africa: occasional minor exporter of wheat, significant exporter of coarse 
grains, principally maize, depending on local harvests 
India: exporter of surpluses of up to 1 million tonnes wheat, depending on local 
harvests, broadly self-sufficient in coarse grains 
Saudi Arabia: exporter of around 2 million tonnes wheat mostly to Asia, but a large 
importer of coarse grains (up to 5 to 6 million tonnes) 
Turkey: exporter of varying wheat surpluses averaging 1 to 2 million tonnes depending 
on local harvest, relatively small net exporter of coarse grains (around 300,000 tonnes) 
Kazakhstan: (currently exporting around 3 million tonnes wheat) 
China: net wheat importer, net exporter of coarse grains (up to 10-12 million tonnes) 
1.2 Grain Imports 
On the demand side a number of different types of importers may be identified: 
• chronic food deficit countries whose import requirements are relatively stable and 
predictable (much of the iv!iddle-East and North Africa [Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco] would fall in this category, along with a number of Asian importers such 
as Rep of Korea) 
• food importers with small, specialist import needs e.g. importation of hard wheat to 
Europe for flour quality blending 
• countries that meet a large proportion of their consumption needs from domestic 
harvests but who import in order to meet the unfilled gap between domestic 
production and consumption - their import requirements fluctuate with domestic 
harvests (e.g. China, Former USSR, Brazil, Pakistan, Mexico) 
The dominant role of developing countries as a whole in the international grain market 
is as food importers. Wheat imports are of key importance, in the following regions. 
• Central and South America (Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia and many 
of the countries of central .A.merica). South American importers are supplied mostly 
by Argentina, with Central America supplied mostly by Canada and the US. 
• The Middle East (supplied by USA, Canada, EU and Australia) and North Africa 
(supplied mainly by USA/ELT). 
• South Asia and South East Asia (supplied mainly by USA, Canada and Australia). 
• Sub-Saharan Africa (relatively small but increasing quantities, with growing 
consumer demand for bread supplied mainly by EU and USA). 
• The former USSR (supplied mainly by the EU and USA). Wheat imports currently 
drastically reduced due to economic difficulties. 
There are major imports of coarse grains into: 
• Central and South _-\merica (especially Mexico) 
• North Africa and Saudi Arabia 
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• South East Asia (e.g. Taiwan, Rep ofKorea, Malaysia) 
• countries in Southern Africa - imports of maize for human consumption, with highly 
variable demand depending on local harvests 
• Former USSR. 
The larger importers of coarse grains among the developing countries tend to be the 
relatively richer countries (oil exporters of the Middle East, East Asian 'tigers') 
reflecting the growth in demand for livestock products and/or rapidly rising incomes. 
The income elasticities of demand for coarse grains are much higher due to demand 
derived from increases in consumption of livestock products (meat, poultry, eggs, milk 
etc). There is some evidence that multinational company (MNC) grain traders are 
becoming involved in these markets, particularly in the area of animal feeds - which is 
relatively less politically sensitive than human staple food markets. 
Most of the growth in world wheat consumption has been due to population growth 
(due to its relatively low income elasticity of demand - particularly in developed 
countries), although urbanisation and dietary changes in developing countries are also 
influences on the growth ofwheat consumption. Due to these factors, developing 
countries account for the majority of consumption growth. Some of the greatest 
increases in consumption over recent years have been in China and India, with much of 
this satisfied by increases in domestic production. 
The world markets for wheat and coarse grains are connected due to the 
substitutability between the two (wheat may be used as feed, and often is especially in 
Russia and Europe). However, this is limited by the differing conditions under which 
wheat is produced and their differing elasticities of demand, meaning that it is possible 
for wheat prices to be high when coarse grain prices are low, and vice versa. 
2. Major International Grain Traders 
2.1 The Major Players 
The international grain trade is dominated by a small number of multinational 
companies (NINCs). The five largest players are usually listed as: 
• Cargill (based in Minneapolis, US with subsidiaries and joint ventures around the 
world) 
• Continental Grain (based in New York) 
• Louis Dreyfus (head quartered in Paris) 
• Andre (Swiss-based, but with a major US subsidiary under the name Garnac) 
• Bunge and Born (headquartered in Sac Paul a) 
There are also a number of other international grain trading companies which have 
emerged more recently. The Swiss-based company Glencore has a high trading profile 
in the countries of southern Africa across a broad range of commodities including 
minerals, petroleum as well as grains. Toepfer International is also another grain 
company which has emerged onto international markets in more recent years. A 
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number of Japanese companies have established sizeable interests in the US grain 
export market, including ownership of grain storage and handling facilities. These 
include Zen-Noh, Mitsui and Marubeni. In the key US market two other major grain 
exporters are worthy of mention due to their reported growth in recent years. These 
are ConAgra Inc. which is a Nebraska-based quoted company with a diversified set of 
interests in the food industry ranging from grain and oilseed trading, milling and 
processing to a wide range of branded consumer food products, and Archer Daniels 
Midland Co. which has also emerged as a major US grain exporter with significant 
interests in the milling sector, and links with Toepfer. 
The most notable feature about the companies is the fact that all ofthe 'big five' are 
privately held companies (i.e. not publicly listed). As a result it is difficult to obtain 
independent information about their activities, and indeed the main international grain 
companies are reknowned for their secrecy. There are good reasons why the 
companies are secretive - market information is a key determinant of success in the 
grain business. Due to the large size and importance of the major players involved, 
information about the activities of any one company constitutes a major piece of 
market intelligence. In addition, the culture of secrecy may be due to the need for 
companies to prevent knowledge about recently agreed forward contracts from 
becoming publicly known because this could potentially have a significant short-term 
influence on the price of futures contracts (or options) which they need to purchase in 
order to hedge price risks. Relatively small changes in the margins involved in deals 
involving large quantities of grain can have a major influence on the profitability of a 
transaction (Cramer, 1993). 
It is important to note that most of the traders do not specialise in grain alone, but 
handle a wide range of commodities, especially feedstuffs and oilseeds, but also non-
agricultural commodities in many cases. In addition, most of the large companies 
show signs of developing an increasingly diversified business base, perhaps reflecting 
the fact that margins are more attractive in value-adding processes and that the risks 
remain substantial in pure grain trading. In general the companies have tended to 
invest in developing activities more related to grain distribution and processing with 
much less involvement in upstream landowning and farming activities. 
Atkin (1995) cites a number of reasons which underly the dominance ofthe major 
MNC grain traders: 
• the need for large turnovers to bear the costs of maintaining global trading networks 
• economies of scale in information - large grain companies have agents around the 
globe in major producing, exporting and importing nations monitoring market 
conditions 
• economies of scale in grain storage and transportation - a function of the 
technology of storage and transport equipment 
• greater size provides cheaper access to credit, giving a crucial advantage in a large 
turnover business where fractional differences in margins impact crucially on profit 
levels 
• size provides for risk diversification - if one trade produces a large loss this can be 
offset against other more profitable trades, reducing the risk of catastrophic losses. 
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Cargill is perhaps the best-known, largest and most diversified of the international 
grain companies. It is the largest privately held company in the US, headquartered in 
Minneapolis and still controlled by the Macmillan family who are descendents of 
Cargill's founder. Cargill's interests spread across a broad range of commodity trading 
activities (including oilseeds, cotton, sugar, coffee and petroleum as well as grains), 
agroprocessing (including oilseed processing, flour milling, starch production, cotton 
ginning, and feed manufacture), fertilisers, hybrid seeds, steel manufacturing and 
financial and trade services. 
Figures released by the company and quoted by K.neen (1995) suggest that Cargill has 
both grown rapidly and radically changed the structure of its business over the past 
two to three decades. Between 1970 and 1990 the proportion ofCargill's business 
accounted for by trading in bulk commodities declined from 3 7. 3% to 17.6% of net 
worth, with a balancing increase in non-merchandising activities (i.e. milling, 
processing, agricultural products, industrial products and financial services). The value 
oftotal sales has grown from US$2 billion in 1971 to US$47 billion in 1994, reflecting 
the company's high level of reinvestment of profits and its stated strategy of doubling 
the size of its business every five to seven years. Another report from OECD suggests 
similar trends, with the share of trading in Car gill's total turnover reportedly falling 
from 55% to 25% between 1970 and 1985. Diversification and an emphasis on 
growth through long-term investment (and relatively lower dividend payouts) appear 
to be the dominant trends . 
Bunge and Born are headquartered in Sao Paulo and appear to be strongest in South 
America, though they are also well represented in North America and Australia where 
they are involved in joint ventures with Goodman Fielder the largest Australian milling 
company. Bunge and Born is a major influence in the Argentine economy (Atkin, 
1995, reports that Bunge and Born provided two successive Economics Ministers to 
the Menem presidency). It appears that Bunge and Born, along with Cargill, are 
dominant in the Argentinian grain market. Relatively little is known about the other 
grain trading companies. · Louis Dreyfus are reportedly primarily a commodity trading 
company with less diversification into processing (although there are a number oflarge 
agroprocessing ventures in Argentina and Brazil) and a relatively greater profile in the 
shipping industry. Its interests in US grain elevators are managed under a joint venture 
agreement with Archer Daniels Midland. In addition, there are significant US and 
European interests in the petroleum and natural gas industries. 
And re trade in the US under the name of the Garnac Grain Company but appear also 
to have significant international interests in agroprocessing (for example, they have a 
major joint venture in South Africa with Genfoods a local company in the flour milling 
and feed manufacture subsectors). They are also reported to be strong in Far East 
markets (De Maria, pers comm.). Continental Grains are a US-based company and are 
usually considered to be the second largest presence in the international grain market 
(after Cargill) . Continental have a broad geographical spread with a trading branch in 
Geneva. Continental Grain were reportedly the first of the major trading companies to 
enter the Chinese market, and now have a range of joint ventures in feed, poultry and 
agroprocessing. They also reportedly have a significant presence in central and south 
America, with some local involvement in flour milling e.g. flour milling joint venture in 
Grenada. 
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2.2 Concerns about the role of MNCs 
There has been concern about the oligopolistic structure of the international grain trade 
and the role of multinational corporation (l\IINC) grain traders over a number ofyears. 
Farmers in the US have been accusing Cargill of manipulating the price of grain for 
over a century (The Economist, 9.3.96). The most important concerns about the role 
of the l\IINCs revolve around their ability to affect prices. Atkin emphasises the fact 
that the profits of the l\IINCs grain traders are derived :from margins, rather than the 
absolute level of prices. Thus, over the longer run, Atkin argues that l\IINCs do not 
have a strong interest in influencing the level of prices. Nonetheless, commentators 
:from the industry in the trade literature clearly view higher prices as an opportunity to 
improve profit levels, and the dynamics of markets would suggest that rising and 
higher prices in general offer greater scope for widening trading margins. Thus, 
Atkin' s observations on this area appear questionable. 
However, it is unambiguously in the interests ofl\IINCs to influence short-term prices 
and there are frequent rumours about big companies trying to affect closing prices in 
Europe or Chicago. It seems likely that this sort of price manipulation is possible in 
certain markets. There may be a case for particular concerns over possible 
manipulation of interlocking markets in physical commodities and futures and 
derivatives due to the strength of most ofthe l\IINC grain traders in both physical 
commodity markets and related financial instruments. 
Over the longer term, grain prices are determined by broader forces affecting supply 
and demand including technology, policy, weather, demographic trends, dietary 
changes and macroeconomic performance. Given this framework it appears unlikely 
that the oligopolistic structure of grain trading exerts a significant influence on the 
longrun price level. The only possible means by which grain traders could influence 
the longrun cost of food would be for a lack of competition to inhibit the efficiency 
with which traders carry. out the grain exchange and distribution functions, resulting in 
higher marketing margins than under perfect competition. 
Commentators suggest, however, that the major grain traders do compete aggressively 
with each other, and that there is little evidence of collusive behaviour in the market 
(Atkin, 1993; Brown & Goldin, 1992). This has been confirmed by past studies by the 
United States General Accounting Office and academics (Caves & Pugel 1982, quoted 
by Donaldson 1987) which have suggested that international grain markets are highly 
competitive and that returns to capital of the major traders are comparable to those in 
other industries. 
The pattern of US grain storage does not suggest that the big l\IINC grain traders have 
a dominant position in terms of control over storage and stocks. ·In 1991 the 10 
largest US grain companies owned an aggregate storage capacity of 1.579 billion 
bushels, out of a total US grain storage capacity of over 21 billion bushels. Around 
60% of the total US storage capacity is located on-farm, this pattern having been 
stimulated by government subsidy incentives to farmers (Oehrtman and Schnake, 
1993). In the case of export elevator capacity, USDA figures show that in 1989 the 
five major multinationals controlled 46% of capacity (down from 50% in 1981 ). The 
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remaining capacity is held by farmer -owned cooperatives ( 15% down from 21% in 
1981) and others including port authorities and rising export traders such as ConAgra 
and various Japanese interests (39% up from 28% in 1981). 
Events over recent years suggest that the grain trade market is highly contestable with 
the newcomers mentioned above demonstrating an ability to overcome the barriers to 
entry to the market. The rise of various challengers to the 'big five' illustrates this 
possibility, although it is not possible to illustrate trends in this area with 
comprehensive quantitative evidence. Another example of a new entrant was the rapid 
rise of the ltalian-based company Ferruzzi which expanded agricultural trading 
activities throughout the 1980s, growing to be a widely diversified corporation with an 
active profile in US markets. Only in the past two to three years has the company been 
forced into restructuring due to trading losses and greatly reduced its profile in 
international grain trading. 
Finally, Atkin cites the rise of Cook Industries during the 1970s, eventually to a 
position where this grain and soybean trading company challenged the big five. 
Subsequently, Cook Industries collapsed due to a very large unhedged position in the 
soybean market. Nonetheless, the collapse of Cook Industries opened the way for 
major asset aquisitions by Mitsui, a major Japanese trading company in the US grain 
market. This has been followed by further Japanese incursions, so that in the 1990s 
Japanese trading interests own significant grain storage and handling facilities across 
the US which, combined with their financial strength and global networks, offer a 
genuine challenge to the big five. 
3. Evidence on Regional Involvement of International Grain 
Companies 
3.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 
There appears to be relatively little involvement of international grain companies in 
local grain purchasing in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Cargill have the highest general 
business profile in SSA, with involvement in hybrid seeds, fertiliser, oilseed processing 
and cotton ginning, though relatively limited involvement in grain trading within the 
continent. The lack of involvement in grain marketing is not surprising given political 
sensitivities and the history of government intervention and control of grain marketing 
in the region. International companies have undoubtedly been involved in supplying 
much of the food aid which has entered Africa, on behalf of a variety of donors. In 
addition, commercial imports of relatively small quantities of wheat are common 
throughout most SSA countries to supply local milling companies. South African 
interests appear to control much of the milling industry in southern .Africa, and there is 
evidence of international investment in milling in other parts of SSA e.g. German 
interests in flour milling in Ghana and Nigeria. Otherwise it appears common that local 
milling industries in SSA are owned to a large extent by the various trading minorities 
scattered throughout SSA (communities oflndian, Lebanese or Chinese origin). 
Imports of grains are thus, often arranged by the local milling industries, purchasing 
from the international grain companies or other external suppliers. For example, 
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Cargill, Andre, Louis Dreyfus and Glencore have been involved in supplying Australian 
and European wheat to countries in southern Africa (Mozambique, Namibia, 
Swaziland) on a C&F basis (i.e. delivery to port). 
However, there are one or two signs that international grain companies are showing 
more interest in sub-Saharan Africa as a trading arena. The political transformation of 
South Africa, and the lifting of sanctions has encouraged international trading 
companies to become involved in the South African grain market. South Africa is a 
major international producer of white maize which is the staple food for the southern 
Africa region, but which has a thin world market. The South African Maize Board has 
recently been reformed and the grain trade has been largely liberalised - although the 
Wheat Board remains a single channel parastatal marketing system. Cargill re-
established their office in South Africa at the start of 1995, and have concentrated 
initially on trading operations. During the past year South Africa has been exporting 3 
million tonnes of maize, with 1.8 million tonnes allocated to the private sector. Most 
of the private sector exports have been undertaken by international companies with 
Car gill, Glencore, Andre and Louis Dreyfus accounting for the bulk of private sector 
exports to markets in Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Mexico and Venezuela. 
Mitsui, the Japanese trading company, are also active in the South African maize 
market. The focus this year has been on markets outside the African continent due to 
the good harvests experienced throughout the southern Africa region, resulting in a 
regional maize surplus. Louis Dreyfus and Continental Grains have also recently 
opened trading offices in South Africa, while Bunge and Toepfers operate in South 
Africa through agents. Andre, having never left South Africa throughout the period of 
sanctions, are involved in a joint venture in the flour milling and feed manufacture 
subsector with Genfoods a large privately held South African food company. 
Cargill's manager in South Africa reports that the usual strategy for Cargill in moving 
into a new market would be to initially establish a trading operation with a relatively 
low asset base. Foil owing a learning process about local market conditions, Cargill 
would then normally seek to diversify its operations through investment in value-added 
processing activities where margins are usually more attractive than in trading. Up to 
now Cargill have not been involved in grain trading in other countries in the region 
citing the difficulties of unreliable rail systems, costs associated with transport delays 
(demurrage etc) and theft. However, there are plans to explore opportunities for 
cross-border grain trading in the southern Africa region, now that a greater 
understanding of the market conditions has been built up. In addition, Cargill expect 
to start developing a local asset base and begin to move further into value-added 
processing businesses, such as cotton ginning, flour milling, oilseed processing, animal 
feeds etc. 
With the privatisation of wheat imports in many countries in the region private millers 
are becoming directly involved in purchasing from the world market, increasing the 
demand for supply contracts which deliver wheat to the millgate with payment in local 
currency. Thus, international grain companies may invest in local operations in order 
to supply this fuller service. Another important influence that the international traders 
have had is in developing the agricultural futures exchange in South Africa, through 
adding greatly to the liquidity ofthis market and in educating and motivating change. 
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Zimbabwe and Zambia are two other countries in sub-Saharan Africa where 
international grain traders have shown some interest. Both countries have commodity 
exchanges and a significant commercial farming sector. Zambia, in particular, has 
implemented a radical programme of agricultural marketing liberalisation which has 
opened the path for the involvement of international and South African commodity 
traders. Evidence cited by Coulter, Heath and Stringfellow suggests that foreign-
owned companies have been able to purchase maize stocks financed through dollar 
borrowings at interest rates related to LIBOR, with the borrower carrying the foreign 
exchange risk. This has enabled foreign companies to purchase large amounts of grain 
at harvest, and creating effective demand at the farmgate. 
One interesting recent development is the involvement of Glencore in purchasing 
government warehousing facilities under Tanzania's privatisation programme. 
Glencore reportedly have the most developed trading network of international 
companies in the southern Africa region, having stayed on in South Africa during the 
period of sanctions and also developed relations with the Zimbabwe Grain Marketing 
Board. The move into Tanzania signals further penetration into the region by foreign 
interests, and may herald the likelihood of further incursions associated with the 
privatisation of public marketing infrastructure. It has also raised concerns about the 
possibility of monopoly control ofwarehousing. Coulter (pers comm.) argues that the 
development of a warehousing service industry which is publicly accessible to trading 
interests may be one of the key pre-requisites for the development of a competitive and 
efficient private sector grain marketing system. In this regard, the consolidation of 
ownership of privatised warehousing facilities under the control of a single trading 
company may not be a desirable development. 
To summarise, SSA does not at present exhibit heavy involvement ofMNC grain 
traders- in grain trading per se. There are a number of reasons for this: 
• the relatively small si~e and low purchasing power of most African markets 
• the existence oflocal trading minorities who have built up local distribution and 
processing businesses in many countries 
• the history of government intervention, and difficulties in financial markets, foreign 
exchange 
• the lack of development of large-scale commercial grain production, with the 
exception of South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe where MNC grain traders are 
now showing signs of interest. 
3.2 South and Central America 
As noted earlier the international grain companies are well-represented in South 
America, particularly in Argentina where Cargill and Bunge appear to be the biggest 
players. These two companies also have extensive interests in Brazil. Privatisation of 
much of the state's interests in the Argentinian grain marketing system suggests that 
these companies are likely to strengthen their hold over Argentinian grain exports 
through further purchase of storage and handling facilities. This will further reinforce a 
trend since the mid 1970s of increasing private multinational control of Argentinian 
grain exports (OECD, 1993). Examination of the 1995 pattern of ownership of grain 
export/import terminals in Argentina shows that Cargill and Bunge have already 
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established a presence, although the Junta Nacional de Granos is, as yet, still the 
dominant owner of these facilities. This is likely to change over the next few years. 
Similarly Brazil's wheat marketing system has been liberalised. Cargill have had a 
grain purchasing presence in Brazil over a number of years, even though Brazil is a net 
importer of wheat and coarse grains. 
With the exception of Argentina most of the Central and South American countries are 
grain importers, purchasing large quantities of wheat and coarse grains. The extent of 
involvement of international grain companies in local markets in Central and South 
American countries appears to vary. This is probably due to the variations in the 
extent of government intervention in the grain market. For example, in Venezuela 
which imports nearly 1 00% of its annual wheat requirement of about 1.1 million 
tonnes, three subsidiaries of multinational grain companies account for around 75% of 
the national wheat milling capacity. This may be a function of the fact that import 
licensing and other restrictions have been eliminated. By contrast, in Colombia which 
imports about 900,000 tonnes ofwheat (as well as 1 million tonnes of maize mostly for 
human consumption) most of the milling industry appears to be in local hands. In this 
case, the government obliges local processors to purchase local crops at prices above 
the world market level through 'absorption agreements'. In addition, the Ministry of 
Agriculture controls import licenses. 
It is not clear the extent to which multinational grain companies are involved in the 
development of local marketing structures which serve the marketing needs of local 
farmers. It appears, like southern Africa, that the involvement of international grain 
trading companies is mainly concentrated on the supply of imported grains, value 
adding activities serving primarily urban food markets (and feed markets). Local 
purchasing appears to take place where large-scale commercial farms are producing 
grain in commercial quantities. 
3.3 Asia/Pacific Rim 
Developments in grain markets in the countries of Asia and Pacific Rim are being 
driven by the dynamic economic growth throughout the region. Thailand, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, among others, are all exhibiting fast economic growth, with rising 
incomes and increasing urbanisation. Populations across Asia are increasing their 
intake of livestock-based products, resulting in rapid growth in demand for feed grains 
across the region. There is also a related growth in demand for processed and 
consumer food products resulting in expanded demand for wheat imports. 
The evidence on the role of !vfNCs is that there is increasing investment, but mainly in 
processing industries - milling and animal feeds, and moderated by the influence of 
government policies. Reuters (12.12.95) report that Cargill plan to invest US$1.5 
billion over 1 0 years in Asian markets, raising their proportion of net worth in the 
region from 4.5% to 10%. This investment will focus mainly on grains and oilseeds, 
particularly oilseed crushing, animal feeds and poultry sectors. Again government 
policy appears to play a major part in influencing the investment decisions of!viNC 
grain traders. Indonesia is reportedly rapidly liberalising its grain and oilseeds sector 
allowing Cargill to enter this market. However, Vietnam presents more difficulties 
with foreign traders still prevented from operating internal distribution networks. 
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Involvement in actual grain trading appears to be relatively limited due to government 
controls in many countries in the region. The huge grain markets of China and India 
are heavily controlled by the state, and are likely to remain so for the forseeable future. 
In China, despite a general trend towards privatisation, the State Council has banned 
all but selected state-run trading firms from trading in grains and edible oils. 
Nonetheless, China represents a huge potential market and the MNC food giants are 
actively investing in processing, livestock production and feed industries, usually 
through joint venture arrangements with local interests. Similar developments are 
taking place in India, where foreign companies are able to obtain clearance for 
investments. Cargill have established a hybrid seed facility in Bangalore, but the Indian 
agribusiness market remains very difficult to enter for foreign investors. 
It is also apparent that the dynamic Asian economies are also spawning their own food 
industry giants. For example, the CP Group is a Thai multinational with businesses 
across South East Asia. A subsidiary of the CP Group has recently taken over 
Bogasari the Indonesian milling company which controls around 85% of the 
Indonesian flour market, and is also planning to invest heavily in China. It would not 
be surprising in the future to see Asian companies begin to challenge the established 
MNC grain traders. Japanese companies also appear to be well-established in Asian 
markets. 
3.4 Former USSR 
There is relatively limited information about the activities ofMNC grain traders in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union. At present Kazakhstan appears to offer the 
greatest potential as a grain exporter, currently exporting around 3 million tonnes of 
wheat. Analysts at the International Grains Council report that international grain 
traders are beginning to invest in the major grain producing areas of the former Soviet 
Union. As the big companies will be aware, in the longer run, there is a high potential 
for grain production in Russia, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine and other parts of the former 
Soviet Union provided the current difficulties of economic transition can be overcome. 
One major example which can be cited is the involvement of Cargill in grain trading in 
Kazakhstan through Cargill-Dan, a joint venture with a local Kazakh company. The 
main activities are purchasing Kazakh wheat and barley for export, and importing 
vegetable oil and sugar. Investments in grain silos have been made, and Cargill are 
adapting to the business conditions in transitional economies by offering to supply 
diesel fuel and other inputs to local farmers in return for supplies of grain at pre-agreed 
prices. The Financial Times sees the possibility of foreign investors acting as key 
catalysts in overcoming major problems in the agricultural sector including wastage 
and poor distribution systems. 
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4. Key Structural Trends in International Grain Markets 
It is possible to identify a number of key structural changes which are taking place in 
the international grain market. 
4.1 Policy Changes, Storage and Price Behaviour 
The structure of world grain storage is changing profoundly in response to agricultural 
policy changes and related trends in the international market. Throughout the world 
there is a general trend towards decreased government intervention in agricultural 
markets, though agricultural policy remains a key influence. Reform of the EU' s 
Common Agricultural Policy and US Farm Policy will result in relatively less 
government intervention in the form of price support and subsidised storage activities 
resulting in lower stockholding by government bodies such as the US Commodity 
Credit Corporation or various intervention boards in the EU. 
FAO (1993) projects that global food stocks are likely to be reduced ifthe private 
sector does not step in to undertake storage activities following government 
withdrawal. In addition, market analysts at the International Grains Council indicate 
the likelihood that a variety of hidden costs of storage may now be pushed into the 
private sector. Thus there is considerable uncertainty over the likely response of the 
private sector grain trade to the withdrawal of government from much storage activity. 
While the private sector may need to increase their involvement in storage activities to 
safeguard access to supplies, most analysts expect that much ofthe public sector 
stockholding will not prove to be privately profitable, resulting in an overall reduction 
in stockholding 
With reduced worldwide stock levels, some commentators, including the International 
Grains Council and the World Bank (Commodity Markets and the Developing 
Countries, 1996), projec~ the likelihood of increased price volatility. The price buffer 
that government-subsidised storage effectively provided will in future be removed, 
with a much sharper market response to production-shocks, raising the possibility of 
sharp price spikes. This has obvious implications for food security in LIFDCs, and for 
their ability to finance food imports on commercial terms. This is likely to be 
combined with a reduced aggregate availability of food aid and supplies at subsidised 
prices. The CAP reform, for example, will reduce exportable surpluses of cereals from 
the EU by reducing prices, and the Uruguay Round GATT agreement also places 
limits on the use of export subsidies, for example through the US Export Enhancement 
Programme. 
However, a number of other commentators point to the fact that agricultural 
liberalisation should contribute to more stable international prices by removing the 
effects of policies which insulated major markets such as the EU, effectively exporting 
price volatility onto world markets. For example, an analysis based on econometric 
modelling by Sarris ( 1993) suggests that agricultural trade liberalisation should result 
in an unambiguous decline in world price volatility. This may be combined with 
increases in production volatility due to operation of short-run production responses 
on more variable domestic prices. Hazell ( 1993) argues that liberalisation, while likely 
to result in an overall reduction in price variability, could still result in occasional very 
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sharp price spikes in response to production shocks due to a lower overall stock 
buffer. These problems could be particularly severe in certain thin markets (e.g. for 
white maize) and possibly in regions where production volatility was increased as a 
consequence of liberalisation. 
The livestock feed grain market would still provide an important 'hidden' buffer with 
the possibility of diverting large quantities of feed wheat and certain coarse grains into 
human consumption. Donaldson (1987) cites several occasions during the 1970s when 
rapid decreases in feed consumption occurred as a response to grain production 
shortfalls and associated price rises. 
In general, most analysts agree that recent and likely future changes in agricultural and 
trade policies are likely to result in an upward adjustment in grain prices. FAO project 
price increases of 4%, 7% and 10% respectively for international wheat, maize and 
millet/sorghum prices between 1987-89levels and 2000 . The OECD (1995) projects a 
35% increase in nominal wheat prices on the international (unsubsidised) market 
between 1990-93 and 2000 - largely due to strong demand and declining export 
subsidies in the EU and US . For coarse grains, a weaker price increase of just 5% in 
nominal terms is projected over the same period due to an anticipated strong increase . 
in production and exports, particularly from the US. The World Bank commodity 
projections, on the other hand, point to significant declines in real cereal prices over 
the medium term to 2000 and 2005, presumably reflecting assumptions about the 
dormant production potential in major producing countries as a result of production 
restricting policies, and the scope for continuing yield growth. 
Much depends on assumptions made in the modelling dealing with imponderables such 
as the behaviour of stocks in China, or likely future rates of growth in yields. 
However, for the forseeable future it appears safe to assume that there is likely to be a 
moderate worsening in the terms of trade for food importers, particularly low income 
food deficit countries, in the short to medium term. This is likely to lead some policy 
changes in developing countries, such as the reduction of consumer subsidies which 
have frequently been applied to imported wheat, and greater incentives for domestic 
food staple production. 
4.2 Privatisation 
Privatisation has been a major trend in the international grain trade, particularly with 
the withdrawal of governments in importing countries from centralised purchasing of 
imported grains. Richard Rominger, a senior official in the US Department of 
Agriculture, estimates that the current 50% ofthe grain trade handled by private 
buyers could rise to 80%-90% by 2000 . Private millers and feed compounders are 
now increasingly involved in direct importation of supplies from world markets 
(frequently purchasing from one ofthe major lvJNC grain traders) . Major grain 
importing countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco in North Africa or Brazil are 
at various stages in the process of replacing government controlled procurement with 
imports undertaken by private commercial interests. The trends are clear and, given 
the financial demands which governments are facing, are unlikely to be reversed. 
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Privatisation has also opened the way for rvfNC grain traders to extend their control 
over markets in exporting countries e.g. in Argentina (and possibly in future in Canada 
and Australia). The details of the future for the government grain export monopolies 
in Canada and Australia (the Canadian and Australian Wheat Boards) are not yet clear. 
In both cases there are pressures for change and a more liberal or commercial style 
approach. The prospects of changes in this, together with the reduced role of 
government intervention in the US and EU markets is clearly viewed as a major 
opportunity by the major grain traders (P Fribourg [Continental Grains], quoted in 
World Grain, 1996), allowing greater freedom of operation. For example, Kneen 
(1995) provides an account of how Cargill has positioned itself in Canada in order to 
benefit from potential changes to the Canadian Wheat Board. 
However, the end of centralised procurement has also opened the way for relatively 
smaller competitors to supply the smaller quantities required by many individual 
importers. It has increased the importance placed on quality and specialist 
requirements, reducing the relative importance of some of the inherent economies of 
scale advantages enjoyed by the big five. 
It is also important to note that large parts of the world grain market are still subject to 
considerable public control. The Indian and Chinese grain markets are heavily ·· 
regulated by government action, and future policy changes in these two countries will 
have a major influence on the overall shape of world grain markets. At the present 
time, it is difficult to predict policy developments in these markets. 
4.3 Technical and Efficiency Improvements 
The past two decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the technology and 
infrastructure on which international grain trading depends. Improvements in 
communications and information technology have contributed to increasing integration 
ofworld markets in all major traded commodities. Among major exporting countries 
there has been a very large increase in the capacity of grain handling and export 
systems, stimulated to some extent in the aftermath of the 1970s commodity boom. 
This capacity is now more than enough to handle any forseeable needs. 
In many importing countries there have been huge strides in improving the efficiency of 
port and grain handling systems and general supply logistics. The IGC argues that 
privatisation and decentralisation of grain marketing in many countries have also 
advanced the efficiency of grain marketing and distribution, greatly reducing the risks 
of supply bottlenecks and food shortages. Nonetheless, the perception is that sub-
Saharan Africa significantly lags behind most of the rest of the world in these types of 
improvements. 
4.4 Changes in Industry Structure 
A number of observers have attempted to comment on the impact of the various forces 
affecting the grain trade on the structure and organization ofthe industry. It is difficult 
to discern clear cut trends, but a number of observations can be made. Some 
commentators suggest that the past decade has witnessed a trend towards 
concentration in the grain market in exporting countries. Rabobank (a Dutch bank 
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with considerable involvement in agribusiness) suggest that farm level purchases are 
now controlled by smaller numbers oflarger traders. Similarly, Oehrtman and Schnake 
(1993) argue that in the US farmer cooperatives have become less important in grain 
marketing, with a trend towards joint ventures and mergers with larger grain trade 
companies. At the same time, it appears that the number of large private companies 
has increased with the entry of companies such as ConAgra and the Japanese traders. 
The shifts away from centralised purchasing may reduce the barriers to entry for grain 
suppliers because this is likely to result in a relatively larger number of buyers, 
purchasing smaller quantities and paying greater attention to quality specifications with 
the importance of price per se declining somewhat in relative importance. On the other 
hand, the end of centralised purchasing has led to some concentration in the 
processing/milling industries in importing countries who were previously supplied 
through centralised procurement agencies. This is because larger mills are in a better 
position to secure larger international grain shipments on advantageous terms and to 
exploit economies of scale. There is some evidence that the ·:MNc grain traders are 
playing a significant role in this process of consolidation and concentration in 
processing industries in some markets. For example, Santista Foods, the leading 
millers Brazil (and controlled by the Bunge group), have been involved in a number of 
large aquisitions in the Brazilian market (World Grains, Sept 1996). 
The end of centralised purchasing has also reduced the importance of volume handling 
of generic commodities and led to a greater focus on quality and niche requirements of 
specific users/processors. This leads naturally into a greater emphasis on vertical 
integration, with traders either investing directly in increased involvement in 
processing, or through forming strategic alliances. However, it is not clear that these 
forces will necessarily result in consolidation of the ownership of all stages of 
production, marketing and value-adding. Increasing product differentiation may also 
lead to a greater focus on specialisation within a broader framework of strategic 
alliances. For example, Continental Grains recently sold their barge line and 
contracted with the buyer, in a move to concentrate more fully on their core expertise 
in grain trading. 
Commentators also suggest that the financial structure of international grain companies 
is likely to evolve over the coming years, with the likelihood of increasing pressure to 
make use of public capital markets. The Economist, for example, anticipates 
increasing pressure on continued private family control of Car gill, while Continental 
Grains are publicly contemplating the use of public capital markets (World Grain, Sept 
1996). The withdrawal of governments from storage will increase the importance of 
companies' balance sheet strength in financing business. The use of securitisation of 
commodity assets is also likely to increase in importance to reduce the risks of 
commodity financing, particularly in developing markets, and facilitate access to capital 
from lenders. · 
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5. Key Issues for Food Security in Developing Countries 
5.1 Food Security Projections 
Most projections suggest that developing countries as a whole will account for larger 
proportions of the world grain trade, and that in general there will be a growing 
reliance on imported foods to meet nutritional requirements, with a declining self-
sufficiency ratio for developing countries as a whole. For example, an OECD analysis 
(OECD, 1995) projects that imports ofwheat and coarse grains by non-OECD 
countries outside the former USSR will rise by 21% and 65% respectively by 2000 
relative to the 1990-93 average. Similarly other projections suggest that developing 
countries will account for more than 75% of world wheat imports in the year 2000. In 
developing countries outside sub-Saharan Africa this will be a reflection of economic 
growth and the growth of demand for livestock and other processed food products. 
Most of this requirement is likely to be met from increased supplies from OECD 
countries (Brown & Goldin, 1992)- although in South America growth in exports 
from Argentina are likely to play a dominant role. Thus, the international grain trade 
will play a key role in satisfying the food needs of developing countries. Its structure, 
operation and role in world food markets, therefore remain crucial factors in the global 
food security picture. 
Projections on world food security suggest that there will continue to be major 
problems of access to adequate food supplies for large numbers of people. FAO 
project for example, that per capita food supplies will remain inadequate in many 
developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and that approximately 800 
million people will be undernourished in the year 20 10. While most analysts suggest 
that the growth of aggregate world food production will be sufficient to meet growing 
aggregate demand, food security problems arising due to a complex array of forces will 
continue to affect large numbers. 
5.2 Competition in the International Grain Trade 
Within this context, the structure, conduct and performance of the international grain 
trade will remain a legitimate focus of attention. Overall, past analysts have suggested 
that the international grain trade is broadly competitive and does not adversely affect 
public welfare. This will need to be monitored closely, particularly with respect to the 
way in which the grain trade responds to reduced government involvement in grain 
marketing and stockholding. The ability of national competition policy and authorities 
to handle the international grain trade must be questionable, suggesting a role for 
international initiatives or cooperation. 
The international grain trade is becoming increasingly complex with close integration 
with financial markets. For example, the World Bank ( 1996) suggests that speculative 
interest in commodities from hedge funds and other investors may have contibuted to 
the recent price increases recorded on international grain markets. Thus, there may be 
a need for research on the modalities and effects of the interaction of international 
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financial and commodity markets. This is particularly so with the large grain traders 
increasingly developing interests in financial services. 
5.3 Risks from Price Volatility 
Despite studies which suggest an overall decline in price volatility as a consequence of 
liberalisation, concern remains about the risk of sharp price peaks caused by 
production shocks combined with markedly reduced world stock levels. A number of 
commentators suggest that developing countries may be able to guard against such 
price risks by taking positions on futures markets. With the move away from 
centralised parastatal procurement in many developing countries, Hazell (1993) 
suggests that there is no reason why a finance ministry or central bank should not 
engage in such trading in the national interest. There appears to be a good case for 
further investigation of the potential and details of this type of risk mitigation. 
There are a number of other risk mitigation measures which may be considered for 
food deficit countries, including: 
• self insurance by carrying a foreign exchange reserve specifically earmarked for 
food imports to enable immediate response to domestic shortages 
• actions to promote domestic grain production and reduce production variability 
• improvements in transport capacity and infrastructure to improve the reliability of 
import routes and facilitate greater inter-regional trade- with important risk pooling 
effects in some regions. 
In general, the perceived role of food security reserves has become less important. 
The emphasis in most discussions is now on food security reserves as a small 
emergency stock to cover the lead time in bringing in imports. It is generally accepted 
that the use of physical food reserves to stabilise prices is usually costly and difficult to 
administer. 
At an international level some analysts suggest that there is a potential role for an 
international grain stock in buffering consumption against production shocks (Reinsel, 
1993), but it is difficult to foresee how such a programme could be administered in a 
practical way without high costs or distortion of market incentives. Hazell (1993) 
argues that a more cost-effective approach may be some form of foreign exchange 
insurance to enable LIFDCs to compete for imports in years when prices are high. 
There are current examples of arrangements which fulfil this role already in place, 
including the I.l\IJF's Compensatory Finance Facility which provides balance of 
payments support to compensate for sharp increases in imported cereals prices, and 
export credits issued by some OECD countries. Hazell foresees an enhanced role for 
these types of risk mitigation measures under a more liberal tradi_ng framework. 
5.4 Food Security Scenarios in Food Deficit Countries 
An FAO analysis argues that the food trade balance of many low income food deficit 
countries (LIFDCs) has deteriorated over the last two decades, with neither 
production nor the ability to finance food imports keeping pace with growing food 
demands. FAO identify 3 1 countries which have the lowest capacity to finance food 
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imports most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. There are question marks over the 
sustainability of such high food import dependence, with many LIFDC' s purchasing far 
more food than their export sectors can afford through reliance on large irregular flows 
of resources from non-export origins (transfers, concessional finance etc.). In 
addition, these problems are likely to be exacerbated with a reduction in food aid 
availabilities and food exports on concessional terms. As a result FAO argue that 
developing the productive potential of domestic agriculture is likely to be a major 
element of strategies to enhance national food security in many LIFDC' s despite 
evidence which points to the role of food imports in improving food availability in 
countries where significant nutritional progress has been made. 
In general, however, it is a failure of food entitlements, rather than aggregate 
availability at national level, which will be primarily responsible for the food insecurity 
of millions of people in the developing world over the next one or two decades. For 
example, projections suggest that India is likely to be approximately self-sufficient in 
food, but with nutritional entitlement patterns that are likely to leave hundreds of 
millions of people in hunger. More simply expressed hunger is overwhelmingly a 
reflection of poverty. While there will be a requirement for policies which address the 
issues of national food availability, there will be equal need for increasing focus on 
policies and structures which influence the access of food insecure groups to adequate 
food supplies. This may involve paying specific attention to the concerns of particular 
groups at risk, improving marketing structures and harnessing the potential of the 
private sector to distribute food efficiently, increasing understanding of the role of 
women in food production and consumption and understanding the interaction of 
forces which determine livelihood security in risk-prone areas. In the meantime, there 
is likely to be a continued role for food aid in overcoming entitlement failures, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Annex: Terms of Reference & Note 
1. In November 1996 the FAO will be hosting the World Food Summit, which 
has occasioned an upsurge of interest in all aspects of food security. Since an 
important element of food security is the trading mechanisms, both national and 
international, between suppliers and consumers, ODA is commissioning a short paper 
to provide guidance on the structure of the grain trade. 
2. A short review of the structure and operations of grain markets should be 
produced along the following lines: 
• who are the major companies in the international traded grains market, what are 
their shares of the market, and how are the companies structured? 
• what are their stockholding practises (i.e. where are the grains held and by whom)? 
• how involved are multinational corporations in less developed countries (LDCs ), 
specifically in low-income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs)? In particular: 
what percentage of LDC and LIFDC food exports and imports do they 
account for? 
to what extent are their local purchases of grain sold locally? 
what are their market shares in LDC and LIFDC food markets? 
how integrated are their operations in LIFDCs (i.e. do they own a 
significant amount of land, local milling and marketing capacity)? 
• how has the above changed in the last 5-10 years? 
3. It is acknowledged that evidence is patchy on all these issues, therefore it is not 
expected that the paper be comprehensive. The study should be desk based, and no 
other agencies should be approached. The paper should be no more than 15 pages, 
should consist of no more than 5 person days (later amended to 7 person days), and 
s.hould be completed by the end of September 1996. 
Note: 
The paper has attempted to address the points above as fully as possible, and to 
include other relevant information where appropriate. Due to the fact that many 
published statistics and analyses deal with data at a country-level there is incomplete 
information, particularly quantitative data, on the detailed operations of multinational 
companies. However, as much information and comment as possible has been 
included from available sources. 
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